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UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

)
)

KELLY JAMES PICCIRILLO,

)

Case No. 940356

Defence
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Supreme Court by
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an Amended Information \s ill i tliicr ciiniinai counts,
to-wit: ( '01 INT i, Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a First Degree Felony; COUNT
II, Possession of a Controlled Substance with lutein In Disli ilnilc, ;i hrsl IJci-ict Felonv;
and ( C )l NT III, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. Counts I and
II alleged that Defender

-

nt to distribute

methamphetamine and further alleged that both offenses were enhanced to first degree
felonies due U\ DefWid;int\ \u\oi conviction of a iirug offense.
On May 19, 1994, Defendant was found guilty of all three counts niirr JI |in y
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trial. Defendant was sentenced to serve two terms of not less than five years or more than
life and one term of six months, all to be served concurrently. No fine was imposed. At
trial, the Court allowed introduction of evidence of Defendant's prior conviction of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 2nd Degree Felony, as part
of the State's case in chief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in allowing the introduction of evidence of
Defendant's prior drug conviction as part of the State's case in chief?
2. Did the Court's error result in the denial of Defendant's right to a fair trial,
due process, and equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of Utah?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues should be reviewed by the
appellate court for a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Morrell 803 P.2d 292 (Utah
App. 1990).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES ON APPEAL IN THE TRIAL COURT
Prior to the reading of the Information to the jury at the outset of Defendant's
trial, counsel for Defendant asked to approach the bench whereupon counsel for Defendant
objected to the reading of the Information, which included language in Counts I and II that
the charged offenses were "Defendant's second offense of Section 58-37-8(l)(a)ft. The Court
went back on the record and indicated that counsel for Defendant would be given a chance
2

to secure a record on Defendant's specific objection at the first recess (T. 54). At the next
recess, counsel for Defendant renewed his objection on the record in the form of a Motion
in Limine requesting the court to make no reference to Defendant's prior conviction until
the jury had returned a verdict on the underlying charges. Counsel for Defendant also
moved to bifurcate the presentation of the evidence of the underlying charges and the
evidence of Defendant's prior conviction (T. 56-57).
At the conclusion of the State's case, prior to resting and in front of the jury,
the prosecutor offered proof of Defendant's prior conviction by offering State's Exhibit No.
12 which was a certified copy of the Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence,
Order of Probation and Commitment in the case of State of Utah v. Kelly James Piccirillo,
Case No. 931500375. Counsel for Defendant renewed his objection to the introduction of
evidence of Defendant's prior conviction. The court overruled the objection and the exhibit
was received (T. 215-16).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
. . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
3

Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i) & (ii).
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
Section 58-37-8(l)(b)(i).
(b) Any person convicted of violating subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a
Second Degree Felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction of subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a First Degree
Felony.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 4, 1993, Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree Felony (See State's Trial Exhibit 12).
On February 10, 1994, Defendant was arrested for Distribution of a Controlled Substance,
Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia (R. 1). In the Amended Information, Counts I and II were enhanced to First
Degree Felonies because of Defendant's prior conviction. A jury trial was held May 19,
1994. At trial, the state presented evidence by way of the testimony of the narcotic's officers
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involved in the case (T. 66-130, 147-177, 178-186, 189). The testimony of the State
Criminalist (T. 132-142), and the confidential informant who allegedly purchased a quantity
of methamphetamine from Defendant in a controlled buy (T. 194-214).
At the beginning of the trial, the Amended Information, including the language
referring to the Defendant's prior conviction, was read to the jury in its entirety (T. 54). At
the conclusion of the State's case, the court received State's Exhibit No. 12 which was a
certified copy of the Defendant's prior conviction (T. 215-16).

The reading of the

Information and the introduction of the Defendant's prior conviction were over Defendant's
objection.
The Defendant's case consisted of the testimony of Defendant's mother who
testified that the methamphetamine belonged to her and that her son had no knowledge of
the methamphetamine (T. 219-228). The Defendant also testified that the tape recording
of the transaction was from an earlier drug deal and that he did not sell methamphetamine
to the confidential informant on the date alleged (T. 229-235).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Defendant was sentenced
to serve two concurrent prison terms of five years to life and one concurrent prison term of
six months (R. 99-102). Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal July 15, 1994 (R. 103).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed error in allowing Defendant's prior conviction to be
made known to the jury in the reading of the Amended Information and in allowing the
introduction of Defendant's prior conviction in the form of State's Exhibit 12. The trial
court's error violated Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and denied Defendant the
5

right to a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR DRUG CONVICTION.
Section 58-37-8(l)(b)(i) states as follows:
(b) Any person convicted of violating subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a
Second Degree Felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction of subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a First Degree
Felony. [Emphasis added.]
Clearly, the specific language of the statute indicates the intent of the statute
to penalize a person who is convicted of a drug related offense after a prior conviction of
a drug offense. A literal interpretation of the statute is that a person is only guilty of a First
Degree Felony upon second or subsequent conviction. The introduction of any evidence of
the previous conviction prior to the second or subsequent conviction is governed by the
Rules of Evidence.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, excludes evidence which, although relevant,
is excluded because the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. The trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether or not such
evidence should be excluded.
The Defendant's prior conviction was not an element of the offense of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance or Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute.

The prior conviction is only relevant for purposes of enhancing the
6

subsequent conviction. At trial, counsel for Defendant requested that the Court bifurcate
the issues and allow the jury to determine the Defendant's guilt or innocence of the
underlying charges and, if the Defendant was found guilty of the underlying charges, then
either the jury or the judge, as a trier of fact, would determine whether or not the
Defendant had been convicted of a previous drug offense for purposes of the enhancement.
The Court rejected defense counsel's motion.
The underlying issue presented in this case is what safeguards is the Defendant
entitled to an order to ensure that he is given a fair trial? Justice Zimmerman suggested the
necessary safeguards in his concurrence in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). The
safeguard suggested was that of a two-stage trial.

Such a proposal would protect

Defendant's right to a fair trial while satisfying the State's objective to punish repeat
offenders. However, such a proposal must be supported by law. Defendant submits that
it is.
In State v. Loudermilk, 221 Kan. 157, 557 P.2d 1229 (1976), the Kansas
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of such procedural safeguards. That court recognized
the difference between crimes in which a prior conviction is a necessary element and crimes
in which a prior conviction of the same crime is considered in establishing the penalty to be
imposed.

Id. at 1232. Examples of the former include habitual criminal statutes and

possession of a firearm by restricted person. In such cases, the Defendant's prior conviction
places him in a class of individuals which makes certain activity itself illegal. The latter class
of statutes are designed to enhance the punishment for unrelated misconduct which is not
an element of the defined crime.
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Because the alleged prior conviction or misconduct is not an element of the
underlying offense and is unrelated to the underlying offense, its relevance must be
questioned.
Evidence that a person has previously been convicted of the same offense
appears to have relevance, however, its obvious prejudicial value must be weighed against
its probative value, under Rule 403.
In State v. Stewart 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946) the Utah Supreme
Court drew the distinction between statutes that have a prior offense as a necessary element
of the substantive offense and those that are unrelated and use unrelated crimes solely to
impose a greater punishment for the subsequent crime. See Stewart, 110 Utah at 208, 177
P.2d at 385. In Stewart, the Court ruled that the enhanced penalty provision of the DUI
statute then in effect fell under the category of enhancement crimes, and ruled that the case
should be bifurcated. The Court quoted State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 457 (1921)
setting forth the specific procedural safeguards that should be employed in such a case.
The information should be divided into two parts. In the first the
particular offense with which the accused is charged should be set
forth, and this should be upon the first page of the information and
signed by the prosecuting officer. In the second part former
convictions should be alleged, and this should be upon the second page
of the information, separable from the first page and signed by the
prosecuting officer. The entire information should be read to the
accused and his plea taken in the absence of the jurors. When the jury
has been impaneled and sworn, the clerk should read to them only that
part of the information which sets forth the crime for which the
accused is to be tried. The trial should then proceed in every respect
as if there were no allegations of former convictions, of which no
mention should be made in the evidence, or in the remarks of counsel,
or in the charge of the court. When the jury retire to consider thenverdict, only the first page of the information, on which the crime
charged is set out, should be given to them. If they return a verdict of
8

guilty, the second part of the information, in which former convictions
are alleged, should be read to them without reswearing them, and they
should be charged to inquire on that issue. Of course, the accused may
plead guilty to this part of the information, and then no further
proceedings before or by the jury would be necessary. No reason
appears why the accused if he should choose, might not submit this
issue to the court without the jury.
In this way the well-recognized rights of an accused person will be
protected, and the principles of justice and our long-established laws
which have been designed to secure an impartial trial in every criminal
cause will be recognized, respected, and obeyed.
110 Utah at 210.
Defendant submits that the above-described procedure was exactly what was
suggested by Defendant and rejected by the trial court in the instant case.
In State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), the defendant was charged with
the first degree murder of his infant son. The charge alleged that the defendant caused the
death of his son and alleged as an aggravating circumstance that the defendant had
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person.
The Supreme Court, in reversing an order denying Defendant's motion for change of venue,
directed that the trial proceed upon a bifurcated basis, adopting Justice Zimmerman's
approach in Bishop supra. The Court instructed that the jury was not initially to be
presented with mention or evidence of the defendant's prior conviction and that only if the
defendant was found guilty of the intentional and knowing killing was it to be instructed of
the prior conviction. Quoting Justice Zimmerman:
The legitimate interests of the state and the accused can easily be
accommodated through a bifurcated procedure. When the underlying
crime is charged, and enhancing circumstance involving other crimes
or bad acts factually related to the underlying criminal episode are also
charged for the purpose of increasing the severity of the punishment
9

for the underlying crime, the trial court must divide the trial into
separate segments. First, evidence regarding the underlying crime
should be omitted, and the jury should be asked to determine guilt or
innocence based on that evidence alone. Second, if a guilty verdict is
returned on the underlying charge, then evidence regarding the
enhancing circumstances should be heard by the same jury for the
purpose of determining whether those circumstances have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
776, P.2d at 557.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN INTRODUCING THE
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION WAS SO PREJUDICIAL AS
TO DENY DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
The record of the trial court proceedings is devoid of any evidence or
indication that the state introduced evidence of the Defendant's prior conviction for any
purpose other than enhancement of the grade of the offenses charged in Counts I and II
from Second Degree Felonies to First Degree Felonies. There is no evidence from the
record that either the prosecutor or the judge intended to offer or admit evidence of the
Defendant's prior conviction under Rules of Evidence 404 or 609. No evidence of the facts
or circumstances surrounding the Defendant's prior conviction were presented, only the fact
that he had been convicted. The Defendant's character was never placed in issue nor were
any of the other exceptions described in Rule 404(b) met by the presentation of the state's
evidence. Nor can the state take the position that evidence of the Defendant's prior
conviction was admissible under Rule 609 since the evidence was introduced and admitted
before the Defendant even took the witness stand.
Even if it were held that evidence of the Defendant's prior conviction was
admissible under Rule 404(b), it must also meet the requirements of Rule 403. See State
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v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1993). In State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, (Utah 1988),
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant committed
other crimes was established, not because that evidence is logically
irrelevant, but because it tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the
fact-finding process. Indeed, Dean Wigmore has argued, "It is
objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but
because it has too much.11 1 AJ. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law, §58.2 at 1212 (Tillers Rev. 1983).
Thus, evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible unless it tends
to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced
for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to
criminality.
760 P.2d at 295.
The court goes on to quote E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, §190 at 565
(3d Ed. 1984) suggesting the following factors to be evaluated in balancing probativeness vs.
prejudice:
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but of classifying and
then balancing. In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and
the like substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a
variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities
between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the
crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and
the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to over
mastering hostility.
760 P.2d at 295-96.
In the instant case, it is very difficult to apply the factors set forth in Shickles
since there is no evidence of the prior crime, other than evidence of the conviction itself, to
compare to the charges and factual allegations set forth in Counts I and II. The reason
there is no such evidence is because the admission of the evidence of the prior conviction
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was not for the purpose of proving the subsequent crime, but only for the purpose of
enhancing the subsequent crime. For that very reason, evidence of the prior conviction
should not have been introduced in the guilt phase of the trial on the subsequent crime. Its
introduction served no purpose other than to "rouse the jury to over mastering hostility,"
resulting in the denial of the Defendant's right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, it is within the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence
pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence when its prejudicial nature outweighs its
probative value. It is hard to imagine more prejudicial evidence than evidence of a prior
conviction of exactly the same offense as the Defendant is presently being tried for. The
prejudicial nature of the introduction of such evidence is further aggravated by the relative
simplicity of procedural safeguards to prevent such prejudice. Based on the foregoing, it is
respectfully submitted that Defendant's right to a fair trial and due process were violated by
the introduction of the evidence of his prior conviction and that the conviction must be
reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this

day October, 1994.
Douglas D. Terry
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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